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BEYOND GINGLES: INFLUENCE DISTRICTS AND THE PRAGMATIC 
TRADITION IN VOTING RIGHTS LAW 
J. Morgan Kousser' 
Abstract 
Should minority voters who are not numerous enough to form.a majority of an elec-
toral district have a legal right to protection against vote dilution? This question of 
"influence districts" is not new, but has yet not been definitely resolved by judicial deci-
sions. This paper examines the logic, history, and law related to influence districts. 
Any proposal for a legal st.ance on the question of influence districts should continue 
the dominant line of tradition of Congress and the courts, rather than contravene it. 
Therefore, after an introduction. Section II of this paper traces what I term the "practi-
cal" or "pragmatic" tradition in voting rights law from the passage of the Reconstruction 
Constitutional Amendments through the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act and 
the nearly simultaneously-issued U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rogers v. Lodge. Begin-
ning in 1870, Congress and later. the courts, rejected an abstract, formulaic, "bright-line" 
approach to voting rights law except during the period of massive discrimination and dis-
franchisement. Both Congress and the Supreme Court went beyond protecting the bare 
right of members of minority groups to vote. Instead. they realized that to cast an effec-
tive vote, African-Americans and others had to be sheltered from violence, intimidation, 
and fraud, and they had to be free to speak and organize. In the 1940s, courts insisted 
on nondiscrimination in primaries, and in the lat.e HJ60s, they helped guarantee the right 
to be free of recently established discriminatory electoral structures. 
The courts and Congress refused to accept two proffered bright lines: one drawn, in 
effect, between voting per se and everything else, and the other guaranteeing proportional 
representation. Rather. they adopted the less precise. but more nuanced "totality of the 
circumstances" test for proving both intent and effect. 
In Section III of the paper. I discuss the three-pronged test outlined in Thornburg v. 
Gingles. Even though Gingles is sometimes interpreted to imply that courts need pay no 
attention to minority groups that can no! forlll effective majorities of electoral districts, 
I point out that Justice Brennan's opinion in Gingles specifically refuses to foreclose 
that question a:nd argue t.hRt hath- t h(3 log1( of the opinion a.nd conten1porary political 
experience contravene the alleged implication. ;\Iore specifically, I suggest that it is wrong 
for courts to isolate the first prong of the Cin!}le., test from the other two. Viewed as 
,. I want to thank Tony Chavez, Robin Tom 21 , and especially Nancy Ra.mirez for helpful discussions 
and suggestions on this paper. They are not. responsible for a.ny flaws in conception or detail. This 
paper ",'as presented at the Voting Right.s Symposium, University of San Francisco, November 6-7, 1992, 
forthcoming in The Unl1!ersity of San Franclsco Laft' Rel,iew. 
interconnected, the three parts of the test do not preclude a consideration of the question 
of influence districts. Indeed. election data from both hypothetical and actual examples 
demonstrates that. there is no possible theoret.ical division between influence districts and 
control districts. I conclude that there is no bright line in Gingles. 
Section IV of the paper takes a very brief look at some federal court op1111Ons con-
cerning influence districts. concentrating on the Garza, Armour, and Springfield Pm,k 
Disi1'icf cases. Their diverse analyses and criticisms that can be made of them suggest 
two different, but more syst.ematic approaches to the influence district problem - a "re-
sults" approach and an "intent" approac!l - which I flesh out in Section V. In both 
approaches, I concentrate on totality of the circumsta.nces.standards, in line with the 
pragma.tic tradition, the Congress's intent in extending and amending the Voting Rights 
Act in 1982, and the Supreme Court's decisions in JtVhite v. Regester a.nd Rogers v. 
Lodge. Finally, I attempt to respond generally to criticisms of protecting the interests of 
small minority groups. I conclude that both the value of bright-line standa.rds a.nd the 
dangers of relaxing them have been exaggerated. 
BEYOND GINGLES: INFLUENCE DISTRICTS AND THE PRAGMATIC TRADITION 
IN VOTING RIGHTS LAW 
J. Morgan Kousser 
1. INTRODUCTION: THE DUAL ORIGINS OF "INFLUENCE DISTRICTS" 
The questions of how or whether courts should shape electoral structures in order to 
maximize the "influence" of members of minority groups isnornew .. In his dissent in Allell v. 
Board of Elections, the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Voting 
Rights Act to apply to electoral structures, Justice John Marshall Harlan declared that "it is not 
Clear to me how a court would go about deciding whether an at-large system is to be preferred 
over a district system. Under one system, Negroes have some influence in the election of all 
officers; under the other, minority groups have more influence in the selection of fewer 
officers."l Whatever the situation in 1969, after the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act, there is no doubt that Congress has decided that the standard should be that 
minority voters should have a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice -- that is, to 
determine the choice regardless of the desires of majorities of majority group voters -- and that 
district systems protect that right better than at-large systems do.2 That does not, however, 
entirely exhaust the force of Harlan's criticism. What of the case in which members of a group 
cannot form a "political majority,,?3 Should courts intervene to pool geographically compact 
minority group members into one or a few districts, or to stop redistricters from fragmenting 
them? Or should courts decide, in effect, that the groups are too small to have ilny cognizable 
rights, that they will have to make their own way through the political thicket? In the extreme, 
does a group that makes up 49.9% of a "political majority" deserve no special protection as a 
189 S.Ct. 817 (1969), at 842. Italics in original. For parallel comments, see Kirksey v. 
Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 at 161 (5th Cir.) (Hill, dissenting); LULAC v. 
Clemellts, 914 F.2d 629, at 649-50 (5th Cir. 1990) (Higginbotham concurring); SCLC v. 
Evalls, 785 F.Supp. 1469, at 1478, 1486 (M.D. Ala. 1992). In 1978, the Fifth Circuit 
decided that two influence districts were better for African-Americans than one that 
they could clearly control. U.S. v. Board of Supervisors of Forrest County, 571 F.2d 951 
(5th Cir. 1978), at 956. 
2Solomoll v. Liberty Coullty. Florida, 865 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1988), at 1583; Jeffers v. 
Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, at205 .(E.D. Ark . .1989); Palter v. JVashingtoll County. Florida 
653 F.Supp. 121, at 129 (N.D. Fla. 1986); Emisoll v. Growe, 782 f.Supp. 427, at 440 
(D. Minn. 1992). 
3r will leave this problematic term undefined for the time being, discussing problems 
with the concept in Section III, below. Courts have recognized the concept, but left it 
undefined. See Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (1984), at 1401-03, on an "effective 
majority." 
"discrete and insular minority,,4 under the Voting Rights Act or the Constitution, while a group 
that comprises 50.1 % does? This would certainly be a concept of "group rights" with a 
vengeance, protecting larger groups, which presumably have a greater ability to take care of 
themselves through normal politics, more than it does smaller groups, which are more at the 
mercy of majorities.5 
There is also another, more practical, political origin to the influence district problem. For 
many years, those who drew reapportionment plans have been compressing minority 
communities into a small number of districts ("packing") or spreading them thinly into a large 
number of districts ("stacking"), depending on the demography of the area and the objectives of 
the planners. In the post-Reynoldsv. Sims reapportionment in California in 1965, for example, 
the heavily Latino area of East Los Angeles was cut into 9 State Assembly and 6 congressional 
districts. Had the boundaries been drawn differently, Latinos would probably have been able to 
determine the elections of some officials. Once the "control" seats were drawn, if the remaining 
parts of the area had been combined, Latinos would have been able to influence the election of 
other officials very markedly, though perhaps not decisively. Before recent trends in voting 
rights law, Anglo politicians often split up concentrations of minority groups and advised them 
to be satisfied with diffuse influence. Now, some courts are telling them to be satisfied with 
whatever highly concentrated districts, if any, can be drawn, because the law does not protect 
against the fragmentation of minority-minority groups.6 Is this not a continuation of a slightly 
diminished discrimination in another guise? 
II. THE PRAGMATIC TRADITION IN VOTING RIGHTS LA 
A. THE RECONSTRUCTION ENFORCEMENT ACTS 
The dominant tradition in voting rights law in American history has been practical and 
4U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), at note 4. 
5The plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, at 1506 (1980) asserts 
that the Court's decisions have squarely rejected a right to group representation. During 
Senate hearings on the renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, many conservative 
witnesses decried the recognition of "group voting rights." See Voting Rights Act: 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, 97 Cong" 2 Sess. (Washington: GPO, 1982), at 1351-54 (prepared 
statement of Prof. James F. Blumstein); id.,.at 509:..10 (prepared statement of Prof. 
Edward J. Erler); id., at 231 (statement of Prof. Walter Berns). Opponents of giving 
minorities the right to elect candidates of their choice, such as Judge G. Thomas Eisele, 
still harshly decry the concept of "group rights." See Jeffers v. Climon, 730 F.Supp. 
196, at 229 (E.D. Ark., 1989) (Eisele partially concurring), and 740 F.Supp. 585, at 626 
(E.D.Ark, 1990) (Eisele dissenting). 
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flexible, not formalistic and formulaic. It has been a tradition of equity, not of law.7 
In their most cramped construction, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments might be 
held to protect nothing more about the franchise than the bare right to cast a ballot. The first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment does not refer to voting at all, while that of the Fifteenth 
Amendment only states that "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude." The Radical Republican Congresses that passed these Amendments, 
however, were well aware that an effective ballot required much more than just the abstract 
right to attend the polls and cast it. Violence or fraud could prevent people from voting or 
nullify the result. Denial of the right to speak or organize couldundermine e political activity 
and render voting meaningless. Without protection of such rights, the ballot would become 
merely an empty abstraction, not a practical means for former slaves and white Unionists to 
protect themselves. 
Accordingly, Congress passed a series of three Enforcement Acts in 1870-71, the first 
coming within three months of the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment.8 The Act of May 
30, 1870 not only made it a misdemeanor for election officials and others to deny blacks the 
right to vote, but attempted to combat the Ku Klux Klan and similar groups by declaring that 
violence or conspiracy to deny anyone the right to vote was a felony punishable by a fine of up 
to $5000 and a maximum of ten years in prison. Recognizing that widespread terrorism would 
tax the existing skeletal federal enforcement machinery, the 41st Congress increased the number 
of court commissioners and authorized the use of federal troops to protect voting, if necessary. 
Fraud was made illegal, and candidates who lost because of racially discriminatory actions could 
seek injunctive relief in federal courts. 
The Supervisory Act of February 28, 1871 provided for close federal regulation of 
registration and ballot counting to strengthen the protections against fraud and the denial of the 
vote throughout all stages of the electoral process. If two citizens of any city of over 20,000 in 
population requested it, the judge of the federal court containing that city had to appoint an 
election supervisor, who, with special deputy marshals at his disposal, was authorized to 
scrutinize every aspect of voting, from registration, through possible intimidation, to counting 
the votes. Thus, instead of issuing a detailed list of invalid practices, thereby inviting 
Klansmen and political manipulators to invent new methods of nullifying the rights of citizens, 
Congress authorized the appointment of a quasi-judicial administrator with the power and 
authority to deal with techniques of discrimination and chicanery that Congress might not have 
thought of or included in its inventory. During the next two decades, the testimony of federal 
70n the equity tradition in American law, see Peter Charles Hoffer, The Law's Conscience: 
Equitable Constitutionalism ill America (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 
1990). 
8U.S. Statutes at Large, XVI, 140-46, 433-40; XVII, 13. For a discussion, see Harold 
M. Hyman, ed., The Radical Republicans and Reconstruction. 1861-1870 (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), at 509-15. 
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election supervisors was often crucial in unseating fraudulently elected southern members of 
Congress. 
Less than two months later, the Congress attempted to protect the right of free speech 
by declaring it a crime to use force or threats to prevent voters from "giving their support or 
advocacy in a lawful manner towards or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified 
person as an elector of President or Vice President of the U.S., or as a member of Congress of 
the U.S., or to injure any such citizen in his person or property on account of such support or 
advocacy." To the Reconstruction Congress, the still-powerful injunction against intruding on 
the rights of the states had to give way to the attempt to practically protect the right of 
individuals and groups to vote. 
B. FROM THE WHITE PRIMARY TO THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
For many years, from Reese and Cruikshank through Giles v. Harris and beyond, the 
Supreme Court abandoned its practical tradition -- and African-Americans were disfranchised 
and then denied legal recourse.9 The white primary case, Smith v. Allwright, marked a return 
to the original practical spirit of the Reconstruction Congresses. IO In Smith, the Supreme Court 
brushed aside the contention that the Democratic Party was a private group that could set its 
own membership criteria, and that, therefore, the restriction of its primary to whites did not 
represent "state action." As everyone realized, but as previous Supreme Court decisions had 
disingenuously refused to recognize, II in Texas at the time, the Democratic primary was not 
merely an integral part of the electoral process, it was the only election that mattered. Attempts 
to evade Smith by repealing state election laws in South Carolina and requiring a pledge of 
allegiance to white supremacy in Alabama were struck down by lower federal courts. 12 
The Supreme Court strode deeper into the political thicket in Gomillion v. Light/oot. B To 
counteract rising black voter registration in the county that had the highest proportion of 
African-Americans in the country, the Alabama state legislature cut the town of Tuskegee into 
9U.S . v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Giles v. Harris, 189 
U.S. 475 (1903). For a discussion of these cases, see Kousser, "The Voting Rights Act and the 
Two Reconstructions," in Bernard Grofman and Chandler Davidson, Eds., Controversies in 
Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1992), 135-77, at 160-62; Kousser, "How to Determine Intent: Lessons from L.A.," The 
Journal 0/ Law and Politics, 7 (1991), 591-732, at 688-89. 
10321 U.S. 649 (1944). For an excellent historical treatment of Smith, see Darlene 
Clark Hine, Black Victory: The Rise and Fall 0/ the White Primary in Texas (Millwood, 
N.Y.: KTO Press, 1979). 
I I Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). 
12Elmore v. Rice, 72 F.Supp. 516, 165 F.2d 387 (1947); Davis v. Schnel/, 81 F.Supp. 872 
( 1949). 
13"l~A TT C 'l'lO 11Qh,n 
.... v ................ .... .,J./ \.L /vv J. 
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an "uncouth 28-sided figure" that excluded all but four or five blacks from the town limits. 
Despite Justice Felix Frankfurter's reluctance to involve the Court in political matters, a 
reluctance that delayed the reapportionment decisions for nearly a generation,14 he was so 
outraged by the Tuskegee gerrymander that he discarded his abstract principles and faced the 
practical problem of vote dilution. Black votes, Frankfurter and the other justices realized, 
were useless if discriminatory redistricting denied blacks influence in elections. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was both the strongest protection of the right to vote ever 
enacted into federal law and the strongest illustration of the pragmatic tradition in voting rights 
law. It did not merely suspend the literacy test and authorize the appointment of federal voting 
registrars, the provisions that attracted the most attention arfitsl. Like the 41st Congress, the 
89th Congress realized that southern states would invent ingenious schemes to circumvent the 
intent of the law, and in both Reconstructions, new, quasi-judicial administrative officers were 
created to prevent those evasions. Section Five of the Voting Rights Act required all state and 
local legal changes related to elections in "covered jurisdictions" to be submitted for 
preclearance to the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington. But what was a "covered' 
jurisdiction"? Recognizing that it lacked the staff to supervise the whole country, as well as the 
fact that the worst problems of disfranchisement were concentrated in a few Deep South states, 
Congress established a criterion combining the use of a literacy test and a level of voter turnout 
in a particular presidential election that had the vice of seeming jerry-built, but the virtue of 
targeting the Deep South.1 5 Once again, the Congress discarded tidiness and abstractions in 
favor of practical results. 
C. FROM JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI TO BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA, WITH A SIDE TRIP 
TO MOBILE 
Allen v. Board 0/ Elections affirmed the spirit of Section Five and closed off an avenue of 
evasion in covered jurisdictions. 16 To mitigate the effect of an increase in the proportion of 
blacks registered to vote from 7% to nearly 60% in the years immediately following the passage 
of the Voting Rights Act, the state of Mississippi changed the mode of election of many local 
governing bodies from district to at-large and made other offices appointive, instead of elective. 
Contending that these laws had nothing to do with "voting," and that the Voting Rights Act was 
designed only to allow blacks to cast a ballot, not to regulate electoral systems, Mississippi 
l4See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
l5Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969 (New York: 
Columbia Vniv. Press, 1976),312-13. 
16393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
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denied that it was legally required to submit these legal changes to Washington. 17 Not only did 
the Supreme Court reject the state's argument, but it also stated the purpose and scope of the 
Voting Rights Act in the most far-reaching terms. The Act "was aimed at the subtle, as well as 
the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote 
because of their race." Section Five required preclearance of any state law "which altered the 
elections laws of a covered state in even a minor way.,,18 A year later, Congress in effect 
affirmed the Court's interpretation of the Act when it extended Section Five in full vigor. No 
one in the Nixon Administration or Congress made any serious effort to question the Allen 
decision -- in stark contrast with the actions of the civil rights community a decade later, after 
the Bolden case.19 
It is ironic that the first full-blown at-large election case that the Supreme Court heard 
came not from a southern, but from a northern state. It was not enough, the Court said in 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, a challenge to multimember state legislative districts in Indianapolis, 
Indiana, for plaintiffs to contend that an electoral system denied blacks proportional 
representation. Instead, they must show "that ghetto residents had less opportunity than did 
other Marion County residents to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of 
their choice.,,20 This "participate and elect" standard, first enunciated in Chavis, both went 
beyond Mississippi's contention in Allell, which would have guaranteed only a very limited right 
to participate, and stopped short of adopting a mechanical proportional representation rule, 
which would have provided a very bright line. Had the Court in Chavis, or later, the Congress 
in considering renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 1981-82, adopted such a standard, the tasks 
of judges and lawyers would have been much easier: When confronted with an allegedly 
discriminatory electoral system, compare the proportion of minority electors with that of 
minority officeholders. If the first exceeds the second, the plaintiffs win; if not, the defendants 
win.21 Anyone who abjures less specific criteria in voting rights cases as messy and vague must 
justify the rejection of the extremely simple, manifestly judicially manageable standard of 
proportional representation. 
Rather than adopt the proportionality criterion, the Supreme Court chose to remain flexible, 
enunciating a "totality of the circumstances" test in its unanimous decision in the 1973 Texas 
170n the Mississippi laws, see Frank Parker, Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment ill 
Mississippi after 1965 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1990). 
18Id, at 565-66. Italics supplied. 
19For a further discussion of the Allen case and the point made in the text, see Kousser, "Two 
Reconstructions~~ at 1 i 1-73. 
20403 U.S. 124,91 S.Ct. 1858, at 1872 (1971). 
21 The number of seats on the governing body must also be taken into account. The extra 
minority proportion, rounded off, must be equal to the proportion that one member of the 
governing body represents. 
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case of White v. Regester.22 The Court concluded that multimember legislative districts in 
Dallas and Bexar County illegally discriminated against African-Americans and Latinos, while 
the Indiana districts did not, because a series of different factors were present and proven in 
Texas that had not been demonstrated in Indiana. In Dallas, there was a notable and notorious 
history of discrimination. Candidates had to run for numbered places and win by a majority 
vote. Elections were practically controlled by a white slating group, and were often 
characterized by blatant racial appeals. In San Antonio, Latinos suffered from a history of 
discrimination and a markedly unresponsive government, and they faced language barriers.23 
Codified in the Appeals Court case of Zimmer v. McKeithen,24 the "While-Zimmer factors" 
concentrated on the effect of discrimination and dominated voting rights law for several years. 
Providing a general guidance scheme for organizing evidence, not an abstract, mechanical bright 
line test, they were squarely in the main line of the voting rights tradition. 
The plurality opinion in the 1980 Supreme Court case of Mobile v. Bolden gave non-bright 
line standards a bad name.25 Selectively reinterpreting past court decisions, Justice Potter 
Stewart announced that the Voting Rights Act and the 15th Amendment harbored a previously 
unnoticed intent requirement. The requirement, moreover, could not be satisfied by proving 
the White-Zimmer factors, and Stewart did not indicate what would satisfy him.26 Over the 
strenuous dissent of Justice Byron White, who had written not only White v. Regester, but also 
the Court's initial decision on intent in the 1970s, Washillgtoll v. Davis,27 Justice Stewart 
examined the evidence from Mobile piece by piece and proclaimed that no single part of it had 
proven purpose. Four justices disagreed.28 The problem with Boldell was that it discarded the 
"totality of the circumstances" standard and put nothing in its place. It was a soft wall or 
wavering line of demarcation. 
The civil rights community and law school critics exploded. The Bolden decision was 
22 412 U.S. 753, 93 S.C!. 2332. 
23 Id., at 2339-41. 
24485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). 
250f course, an intent requirement had been criticized before. See the trenchant and, 
for a time, prophetic criticisms of Judge John Minor Wisdom in his concurrence in 
Neveu v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (1978), at 231-34. 
26In the Fifth Circuit decision in Neveu v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (1978), which was 
decided along with Boldell, Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat interpreted Zimmer as an intent 
case (at 215, 222) and treated its factors as providing circumstantial evidence of a dis-
criminatory purpose. Stewart could have simply foiiowedTjoflat's lead, as Justice White 
did, in effect, in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
27426 U.S. 240 (1976). 
28 Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall joined in dissent. Justice Blackmun thought the 
purpose case proved, but thought District Court Judge Virgil Pittman's remedy had gone too far. 
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almost unanimously denounced, and the community took the occasion of the 1982 expiration of 
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act to lobby intensively and extensively for a Congressional 
overturning of Stewart's opinion and a return to White-Zimmer. In a rebuke to the Reagan 
Administration, Congress overwhelmingly lined up with the critics, as the much strengthened 
Act passed the House, 389-24, and the Senate, 85-8. The extensive hearings and committee 
reports reverberated with condemnations of Bolden, and the authoritative Senate Report No. 417 
specifically endorsed and enumerated the "Zimmer factors.',29 
Before the revised Act passed, but after it had become clear what its final form would be, 
a new majority of the Supreme Court30 in effect merged Bolden's requirement of proving 
purpose with the Zimmer standards.31 In a 6"3 decision-with Justice White rather triumphantly 
writing the opinion of the Court, the Justices ruled that the at-large system in Burke County, 
Georgia had been maintained for a racially discriminatory purpose, and that that purpose was 
indicated by almost the same list of factors that the Senate Report had set out to prove effect.32 
The Court had returned to relatively clear pragmatism. 
III. THERE IS NO BRIGHT LINE IN GINGLES 
A. THE THREE PRONGS: SEPARATE OR TOGETHER? 
It was four years after 1982 before the Supreme Court commented directly on the 
Congressional amendments to Section Two of the Voting Rights Act. In his opinion of the 
court in Thornburg v. Gingles,33 Justice William Brennan proposed a seemingly simple and 
mechanical, but, in fact, potentially complex and sensitive test for identifying minority vote 
dilution. The first "prong" of the Gingles test appears to rule out "influence districts" by stating 
that in cases involving multimember electoral districts, "the minority group must be able to 
demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district."34 This and the other two prongs of the Gingles test -- minority group 
29"Voting Rights Act Extension -- Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States 
Senate, on S. 1992 with Additional, Minority, and Supplemental Views," 97 Cong., 2d Sess., 
Report No. 97-417, at 28-29. 
30Justice Stewart had resigned, and his replacement, Justice O'Connor, sided with the new 
majority in Lodge, as did Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. 
31 Actually, Justice White fo!1owed the prescient lead of the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Neveu 'i.-Sides, '571 F.2d 109 (978). 
32Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
33106 S.Ct. 2752 (1986). 
34Id., at 2766. 
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political cohesion and white bloc voting at a level sufficient to defeat minority-favored 
candidates in most instances -- originated in the 1981-82 struggle to overturn City of Mobile v. 
Bolden.35 In testimony before a House Judiciary subcommittee considering amendments to 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, James U. Blacksher, the attorney who had argued Bolden 
for the plaintiffs before the U.S. Supreme Court, attempted to answer the call in footnote 2636 
of Justice Potter Stewart's plurality opinion in Bolden for a judicially manageable standard for 
minority vote dilution in at-large election cases.37 As Blacksher made explicit, the standard 
was developed to apply only to at-large elections,38 a fact that Brennan's opinion in Gingles 
also emphasized.39 
Even though Justice Brennan stated that he did ·not mean to decide "what standards should 
pertain to a claim brought by a minority group, which is not sufficiently large and compact to 
constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that the use of a multimember district 
impairs its ability to influence elections," some courts have sought to extend its application to 
single-member-district racial gerrymandering cases.40 Is it logical to conclude that Brennan did 
decide the question -- adversely to small minority groups -- by implication? Does Gingles 
embody an elementary and general bright-line test, invariably applicable to every sort of 
electoral system? 
Some courts and commentators appear to believe so.41 Happy to be supplied with a short 
checklist that seemingly obviates the need to inquire into the intentions of government officials 
or to weigh the various and more numerous factors involved in a "totality of the circumstances" 
inquiry, attorneys, expert witnesses, and judges alike have generally pried the three prongs of 
the Gingles test apart and considered them one by one. As has often been noted, the term 
"majority" by itself conceals problems: Does it mean a majority of the total population? of the 
voting-age population? of voting-age citizens? of registered voters? of those who actually 
35 100 S.Ct. 1490 (J 980). 
36100 S.Ct. 1490, at 1506. 
37"Extension of the Voting Rights Act." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary. House of Representatives, 97 
Cong., J Sess., Part 3, at 2038-39. A later, more easily accessible presentation of the 
standard is in Minority Vote Dilution (1984), C. DAVIDSON, ed., at 231, 234. 
38/bid., 234. 
39106 S.Ct. at 2764-65, n. 12. Brennan explicitly reserved the question of whteher the 
three-pronged test applied to discriminatory gerrymandering of single-member districts 
or other situations. 
40Id., at 2765, n. 12. Italics in original. 
41Solomoll v. Liberty County. Florida, 865 F. 2d 1566 (J Ith Cir. 1988), at 1572, n.4; 
Romero v. City of Pomolla, 883 F2d 14J8 (9th Cir. 1989); Skorepa v. City of Chula 
Vista, 723 F.Supp. 1384 (S.D.Ca1.1989). 
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turn out to vote? What is the legal or logical basis for choosing one of these definitions? 
Without minimizing these difficulties, I think the first Gillgles prong is more logically 
understood when it is combined with the other two, that is, with variations in the cohesiveness 
of both majority- and minority-group voters over a series of different elections. Considered as 
one coherent standard, the Gillgles test is not an abstract, mechanical criterion, but necessarily a 
flexible, practical one.42 For as minority group cohesiveness increases and majority group 
cohesiveness declines, the level of minority group concentration necessary to elect the choice of 
that group declines, and vice versa. No single point of concentration which is much less than 
100% guarantees minority or majority voters an ability to elect. No fixed, situation-free 
definition of a "majority" or "political majority" is possible. AnY'attempt to determine what a 
practical political majority is in any particular circumstance will involve courts in painstaking 
factual inquiries .. A set of simple examples will demonstrate the point. 
B. THERE IS NO FIXED DEFINITION OF A "POLITICAL MAJORITY" 
Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that an area is composed of only two ethnic groups, a 
"majority" group and a "minority" group, and that we have reliable statistics on the proportion 
of each group among those who actually vote in the district. Suppose also that the election pits 
a candidate favored by at least a majority of one group against a candidate favored by at least a 
majority of the other group. I refer to one as the "majority's candidate" and the other as the 
"minority's candidate." Then it is obvious that which candidate wins is a function not only of 
the proportion that minority voters form of the active electorate, but also of the levels of 
cohesion among the two groups of voters.43 Table] illustrates this point in a theoretical 
electorate. 
42For a parallel, but not identical argument, see Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley, 
"Identifying and Remedying Racial Gerrymandering," The Journal of Law and Politics, 8 
(1992), 345, at 354-56. 
43It may need to be stressed that elections are about electing candidates, not about 
meeting some artificial, arbitrary target percentage. In the Ohio State Assembly reappor-
tionment case, Quilter v. Voillovich (Case No. 91CV-2219 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 31, 1992), slip 
opinion, at 7-10), attorneys for the Republican majority on the State Apportionment 
Board claimed that the Voting Rights Act required them to increase the black proportion 
in every district that was already represented by a black -- packing which, of course, 
just happened to decrease black-and therefore Democratic .influence . .incadjacent districts. 
This was especially important, the Board majority declared, in the seven of the eleven 
seats in chich African-Americans did not comprise a majority of the population, but 
extensive white crossover voting allowed black representatives to win. The patent disin-
genuity of this explanation -- Republicans were obviously concerned to elect their own 
(white) candidates by setting meaningless electoral targets for their opponents -- points 
up the unreality of electoral numbers that have no necessary relation to electoral out-
comes. 
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(Table 1 about here.) 
It is easy to see how each row of the table was calculated. Consider the first row. In an 
electorate equally divided between the two groups, suppose that all of the majority voters 
support the majority's candidate, while only 80% of the minority voters support the minority's 
candidate. Then the minority'S candidate gets only 40% of the overall vote (0.5 * 0.8 = 0.4). 
For the other three rows in the equally divided district, we make different assumptions about 
cohesion and compute the results of the election in a similar manner. In the fourth row, for 
instance, the minority candidate gets (0.3 * 0.5 = 0.15) + (0.8 * 0.5 = 0.4), and (0.15 + 0.40 = 
0.55). 
The table demonstrates two striking results: First, even where majorities of each group 
oppose each other's candidates, it is possible for the minority's candidate to win even when the 
minority comprises a tenth of the electorate. As a matter of logic, the statement in the lower 
court opinion in Gingles that "no aggregation of less than 50% of an area's voting population 
can possibly constitute an effective voting majority" is simply false.44 Second, there is no 
bright line, to use legal terminology, or no "natural cutting-point," to adopt the jargon of social 
science, to differentiate "control districts" from "influence districts." Fifty percent of the voters 
is no magic number, nor is forty or thirty or twenty or even ten.45 The outcome, even in this 
very simple example, depends on the relative cohesion of the two groups, and not just their 
proportions of the electorate. And if the example were complicated in an attempt to mimic the 
real world -- including differential registration and turnout rates, different age structures, more 
than two ethnic groups, and variations in cohesion rates in different elections -- the results 
would be even less determinant. If the point of the Gingles standard is to assure that members 
of minority groups have a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their choice, if it is outcomes, 
not just demographic goals that matter, then it is not a mechanical set of criteria. 
In order to draw any conclusions about a minority's opportunity to elect candidates of its 
choice, the cohesion of all ethnic groups seeds to be empirically determined, not filled in purely 
by assumption.46 
44Gillgles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345 (1984), at 381, n. 3. 
45Insisting that 50% of something amounted to an immutable prerequisite in an at-large 
election case, Judge Tjoflat reversed a denial of relief to black plaintiffs who could 
make up 51 % of the voting age population in a single-member district. Solomon v. 
Liberty County, Florida, 865 F.2d 1566 (J ith Cir. 1988), at 1574. 
46In Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F.Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1991), for instance, Judge G. 
Thomas Eisele assumes that white cohesion against a black candidate is high and would 
rise as the proportion of blacks in a district rises. Otherwise, his conclusion (at 570- 71) 
that "the more black voters that are packed into a single legislative district, short of a 
majority, the less the voting power or influence in the state as a whole" does not hold. 
But he makes no effort to test his assumptions empirically. 
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C. EVIDENCE FROM THE REAL WORLD 
The examples need not be merely hypothetical. Other scholars have demonstrated that the 
proportion of various minority groups that is necessary to elect a candidate from that minority 
group varied greatly from time to time and from place to place in the South during the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. The fabled "65 % Rule,,47 has no empirical validity. In certain states or 
counties in the South, a black population percentage of 65% was insufficient to elect a black 
candidate, especially during the first years -after the 1965 passage-of the Voting Rights Act.48 
In others, such as the university communities of Athens, Georgia, Gainesville, Florida, or 
Durham, North Carolina, it gradually became possible to elect black candidates even though the 
proportion of African-Americans was less than 50%.49 Summarizing evidence from Boston and 
Chicago, as well as Charleston, South Carolina and Norfolk, Virginia, Brace and his colleagues 
conclude that "the 65 percent rule for the overall minority population codifies an exception 
rather than the norm .... Determining what is the appropriate population percentage to assure a 
realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of choice in a given case is a matter of considerable 
complexity.,,50 
In California, the degree of white cross-over voting and the percentage of the total Latino 
and Asian populations who register and vote vary at least as much from area to area as 
elsewhere in the country. Part A of Table 2 focuses on the seven congressional districts (of the 
total of 45) in which Latinos or African-Americans held office in 1990.51 In none of the four 
occupied by blacks (districts 8, 28, 29, and 31) did the black percentage of the population 
47 Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398(1984), at 1415 has a capsule description of the rule. 
48In an attempt to rid the Montgomery City Council of the leading black politician in 
the state of Alabama, Joe Reed, Mayor Emory Folmar reduced Reed's district to a bit 
above the lowest black population percentage that some case law said was legal -- 68%. 
This action, the district court found, had a discriminatory intent. Buskey v. Oliver, 565 
F.Supp. 1473 (1983). Since a 68% population majority may not have been enough to 
allow blacks to elect a candidate of their choice in Montgomery at the time (Folmar 
certainly hoped not), the move may also have been discriminatory purely on effect 
grounds. 
49Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley, "The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black 
Representation in Southern State Legislatures," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16 (1991), 
111-28; Grofman and Handley, "Preconditions for Black and Hispanic Congressional 
Success: in Wilma Rule and joseph F. Zimmerman, eds., United States Electoral 
Systems: Their Impact 011 Women and Minorities (New York: Praeger, 1992), 31-39. 
50Kimball Brace, Bernard N. Grofman, Lisa R. Handley, and Richard G. Niemi, "Minority Voting 
Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and Practice," ]0 Law and Policy 43 (1988), at 52, 57. 
51The data was supplied by Pac-Tech Data Research. I want to thank David Ely for 
his assistance in obtaining it. 
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exceed 34%. This, in effect, turns the 65% Rule on its head. In none of the three districts 
with Latino incumbents (districts 25, 30, and 34) did the percentage of registered voters who 
are estimated to have been Latinos exceed 41 %. In liberal Berkeley and Oakland, black 
Congressman Ron Dellums won a district in which Anglos actually composed a majority of the 
population. All of the congresspersons were Democrats, and in all of their districts, Democrats 
enjoyed substantial registration majorities, but those majorities were markedly less in the three 
Latino districts. Apparently, the Latino districts were drawn so that Latinos could control the 
Democratic primaries easily with the hope, which was realized, that non-Latino Democrats 
would rally to the nominees in November. Black candidates seem to have been able to rely on 
more ethnic cross-over votes within the Democratic primary. 
(Table 2 about here.) 
The pattern in the eleven California State Assembly districts (of the total of 80) represented 
by African-Americans and Latinos was more varied. 52 In one "black" district (17), the San 
Francisco district of Speaker Willie Brown, Anglos made up five times as large a group as 
blacks did, but Brown never had to campaign seriously for his own seat during the 1980s. None 
of the seven seats held by African-Americans was actually majority black in population, and 
only two were as much as 40% black. Of the four districts represented by Latinos, there was 
only one in which a majority of the estimated registered voters was Latino. In the 79th, where 
only a sixth of the registered voters were Latinos, Pete Chacon had won an upset victory over 
his Republican opponent during the 1970s, when the opponent was fortuitously indicted a week 
before the general election. The three districts with the highest proportion of Anglos (17, 54, 
and 79) also had the lowest proportion of Democrats, allowing black and brown candidates, in 
effect, to leverage their relatively low population proportions by winning Democratic 
nominations. Then they only had to hold Democratic defections down to be able to cement 
victories in the general elections. 
D. THERE IS NO EASY ESCAPE FROM THE PROBLEM OF INFLUENCE DISTRICTS 
Thus, a close analysis of the Gillgles decision itself and a consideration of hypothetical and 
actual election results demonstrate conclusively that any absolute, general distinction between 
minority control districts and minority influence districts is illogical, impractical, and legally 
unwarranted .. A court that :dismissed a claim of vote dilution onthe:grounds that a minority 
concentration did not reach some mystical number -- 65%, 50%, 40%, or whatever -- might 
52Three Assembly Districts were represented by men of Portuguese ancestry. In contemporary 
California, they are not generally considered Latinos. 
13 
well be robbing the group of a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of its choice.53 Unless 
courts entertain such suits, they will be arbitrarily and unreasonably denying the groups their 
rights under the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. To cut off lawsuits with a bright-line 
rule is to deny equal protection. 
Similarly, any hard-and-fast definition of a minimum level of minority population 
necessary for that group to influence an election is nonsensical. In an attempt to justify its 
refusal to adopt plans providing for a Delta congressional district where blacks would have a 
good chance of electing a candidate of choice, for instance, the Mississippi legislature of the 
early 1980s announced that any black percentage less than 40 "would likely result in 
insensitivity [on the part of the congress person] to the black'communityc"54 So it· created two 
"stacked" districts that were 45% and 48% black, instead of one 65% district. This is a patent 
illustration of the use of an entirely arbitrary numerical figure to justify racial discrimination. 
Naming any minimum level for "influence" would only encourage other authorities to employ 
the same tactic that the Mississippi legislature did. 
IV. INFLUENCE DISTRICT DECISIONS AFTER GINGLES 
A. THE RANGE OF APPROACHES 
Brennan's decision in Gingles offered no clear guidance on the problem of influence 
districts. If the Supreme Court had meant to embrace a bright-line definition, it could easily 
have endorsed those portions of the lower court decision in the case that explicitly endorsed a 
threshold of 50%55 and denied that there could be any "principled basis" for litigating influence 
districts. 56 If the argument from silence has any implications at all here, it suggests that 
Brennan was not disposed to erect such a mandatory gateway test. 
Since 1986, a variety of lower federal court decisions have touched on the problems of 
530ne district court judge rejected a district in which 5 I % of the registered voters were 
black on the proportional representation grounds that since blacks constituted only 13% 
of the county's voting age population, they did not deserve to control one seat on a five-
seat county commission. Paller v. Washington County. Florida, 653 F.Supp. 121 (N.D. 
Fla. 1986), at 129-31. According to Judge Vinson's logic, when Congress rejected a 
proportional representation standard in 1982, it must have meant to establish proportion-
al representation as a minimal threshold, and when Brennan said a majority in Gingles, 
he actually meant a substantial majority. Any contention that bright-line standards 
reduce leeway for judges to impose their own values has a lot to account for in this 
opinion. 
54]ordan v. Willler, 541 F.Supp. 1135 (1982), at 1143. 
5550% of what, the three-judge court did not say. 
56Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F.Supp. 345 (1984), at 381. 
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influence districts. Fortunately, three of them fully span the range of logic and approaches to 
the problem. The first that I will treat interprets each prong of Gingles as a strict mandatory 
separate threshold; the second sidesteps Gingles by relying on intent; while the third blends a 
brief analysis of intent with a discussion of the totality of the circumstances. A consideration 
of each case will suggest the advantages and deficiencies of each approach. 
B. THE FENCE AROUND SPRINGFIELD PARKS 
No black had ever served on the 7 -member board of the Springfield, Illinois Park District, 
which was elected at-large. Despite the fact that it was possible to draw a 7-district plan 
containing one district that was slightly over 50% black in population, and despite the fact that 
blacks had won election to the city's school board with white cross-over votes, District Court 
Judge Richard Mills granted summary judgment to the Park Board because the voting age 
population in the proposed Park district would be only 43% African-American.57 No evidence 
of intentional discrimination or of other White-Zimmer factors was considered. 
The Appeals Court affirmed, interpreting Gingles as requiring an unbreachable 50% voting 
age population standard in at-large cases, despite the fact that Brennan never clarified whether 
the majority was to be one of population, or potential voters, or actual voters, or minorities plus 
cross-overs, or what.58 Noting that the majority threshold requirement had not been 
enunciated in White, Zimmer, 59 or the 1982 Senate Report, Appeals Court Judge Cudahy 
praised it as a newly invented criterion to block unnecessary litigation. "Courts might be flood-
ed by the most marginal section 2 claims if plaintiffs had to show only that an electoral practice 
or procedure weakened their ability to influence elections," the judge asserted.60 
Although Cudahy logically had to believe that a district in which African-Americans made 
up half of the population was some distance down a slippery slope, he also stated that the 
Gingles threshold required courts to "estimate approximately the ability of minorities in a 
57 McNeil v. Springfield Park District, 666 F.Supp. 1208 --full cite needed. 
58851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir.!988). 
59Zimmer, as Cudahy noted, had declared that the size of the minority population was 
not "the barometer of vote dilution." Springfield Park District, 851 F2d at 943, quoting 
Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1303. 
6°851 F.2d, at 947. 
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single-member district to elect candidates of their choice.,,61 Yet neither the District nor the 
Appeals Court made any effort to make such an estimate, and their rejection of a 43% black 
district implies a very high degree of racially polarized voting, a level often reached in the 
North only in elections characterized by stark racial appeals. Assuming that blacks and whites 
turned out equally and that all blacks voted for the same candidate, only 12% of the whites 
would have to cross over to elect the candidate who was the choice of a united black 
community.62 Rather than attempt to determine the likely percentages empirically, through the 
"intensely local appraisal" called for in White,63 the judges in this case were content to do what 
they accused the plaintiffs of doing: building "castles in the air, based on quite speculative 
foundations.',64 That is, they assumed, without 'evidence; that black cohesion or turnout or 
white cross-overs or some combination of them would be insufficient to elect a black-chosen 
candidate. Moreover, their arguments strongly suggest that at least some of the White-Zimmer 
factors -- which Congress intended judges to apply in voting rights cases -- would have been 
satisfied if a full trial had taken place. 
The judges in the Springfield Park District case, then, sought to establish the principle that 
plaintiffs with frivolous cases did not deserve a full hearing. Rather than conduct a "totality of 
the circumstances" inquiry, as Congress in 1982 had indicated that it wished, the Appeals Court 
applied the first prong of the Gingles test separately and rigidly to save itself the trouble. Had 
the District Court or the Seventh Circuit considered all three prongs of the test in combination, 
as Judge Cudahy in effect said courts should do, the judges would have found that minority 
candidates could win election in such a district with a minimal degree of white support, and 
that it was likely, on the basis of school board elections, that candidates who were the choices 
of the black community could at least sometimes obtain that level of cross-over. In other 
words, had the Springfield Park District courts applied the Gingles prongs as a unitary test, 
61 Id., at 944. In Rybicki v. Board of Elections, 574 F.Supp. 1082 (1982), Judge Cuday-
hy had employed a 65% rule for black state legislative districts in Chicago. In Ketchum 
v. Byrne, 740 F. 2d 1398 (1984), at 1412-15, Cudahy had castigated a district court for 
using a 50% voting age population threshold without closely examining "voter registration 
and turnout patterns in the Hispanic and black communities. The district court must 
first gather and evaluate whatever statistical and other types of evidence are available" in 
order to establish "historical and recent trends in the electoral patterns of the black and 
Hispanic communities." The thread of consistency in these opinions is not easily dis-
cerned. 
62In the eleven Ohio State Assembly districts that sent blacks to the legislature in the 
1980s, the percentage of white crossover voting ranged from 35% to 68%. In ten of the 
eleven, at least 44% of the white voters supported the black candidate. Only one Ohio 
Assembly district that was over'35% black in population had Tailed to elect a black 
candidate since 1970. Quilter v. Voinovich, case # 91-CV-2219 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 19, 
1992), slip opinion at 6, 13-14. 
63White v. Regester, 93 S.C!. at 2341. 
64851 F.2d at 944. 
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which is just the standard to which Cudahy's opinion paid lip service, then they would probably 
have sustained the plaintiffs, even if they had insisted that influence district claims should not 
be entertained. Springfield blacks could probably have elected a candidate of their choice in a 
district where they comprised 43% of the potential voters. California and Ohio blacks managed 
with much smaller proportions. 
C. DEMOGRAPHIC FILIBUSTERING IN L.A. 
The vast majority of the three-month federal district court trial in the Los Angeles County 
Board of Supervisors anti-Latino gerrymandering case was devoted to presenting demographic 
and statistical evidence. Gingles, argued the County's private attorneys, implied that unless an 
equally populated district with a majority of Latino voters could have been drawn in 1981, no 
remedy could be afforded, and therefore, the question of liability was irrelevant. Considering it 
too risky to assume that judges would reject the defendants' argument out of hand, counsel for 
the plaintiffs marshaled a parade of expert witnesses who declaimed not only on ethnic 
polarization in elections, but also on such questions as how to estimate the proportion of Latino 
voting age citizens by precinct -- figures no census taker had collected -- how to project 1980 
data forward to 1989, and which countries the parents of American-born people who designated 
themselves as "Hispanics" on census forms actually came from. At times, the witnesses for the 
two sides resembled medieval theologians debating the number of angels that could dance on the 
head of a pin. To many observers, it appeared bizarre that constitutional and legal rights could 
turn on whether an educated guess on which reasonable and honest statisticians could disagree 
was 48% or 52%, or perhaps even closer -- especially since the practical political effect of 
either number was likely to be exactly the same. 
District Court Judge David V. Kenyon agreed with the plaintiffs that a district with a 
majority of voting age Latino citizens as of 1989 could be drawn, and that 1989, not 1980 was 
the proper year at issue.65 He then added two fall-back positions: Even if a 50% district could 
not be drawn, plaintiffs had shown that there would probably be enough ethnic crOSS-over 
voting to elect a candidate who was the choice of the Latino community in a nearly-50% 
district. And even if that were disputable, the County Supervisors had intentionally 
gerrymandered districts against Latinos in the past, committing a constitutional violation, as well 
as a violation of the Voting Rights Act. In other words, the County was liable under at least 
one of two definitions of effect, or, if not, then under intent. 
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finessed the 50% issue by 
resting its decision wholly on the grounds of intent. "We hold that, to the extent that Gingles 
does require a majority showing,. oit does.so··only· in a case wherethe<e has been no proof of 
1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
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intentional dilution of minority voting strength.,,66 Once intent was shown, the Appeals Court 
required only "some showing of injury" in order to "assure that the district court can impose a 
meaningful remedy.,,67 But the necessary injury was just the fragmentation of the core of the 
geographical area where Latinos concentrated, a fragmentation which the Court concluded, 
without citing any evidence whatsoever, reduced Latinos' opportunities to participate and elect 
candidates of their choice.68 Evidently, once the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the area had 
been intentionally split, violation of the "participate and elect" criterion followed automatically, 
as a matter of common sense. Thus, Garza rejected both the bright-line threshold standard and 
the attempt to render an intent case superfluous by requiring a full showing of effect even after 
intent had been proven. Whether the electoral district drawn during the remedy phase was an 
influence district or a control district was something ultimately for the voters and the candidates 
to decide. In the event, all four major candidates in the initial election using the new district 
were Mexican-Americans. 
66Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), at 769. Although he 
partially dissented on the remedy, Judge Alex Kosinski, a leading Reagan appointee to 
the bench, joined the liability portion of Judge Shroeder's opinion "without reservation." 
Id., at 778. 
67Id., at 771. In his dissent in Bolden, Justice Marshall had averred that if intent were 
demonstrated in a Fifteenth Amendment case, no effect need be shown, and vice versa. 
100 S. Ct 1490, at 1536. In [rby v. Fitz-Hugh, 693 F.Supp 610 (E.D. Va. 1988), District 
Court Judge Richard L. Williams rejected the plaintiffs' contention that, once a 
discriminatory intent was shown for the passage of the law in the l870s and its 
maintenance in 1901 and 1956, no current intent or effect need be demonstrated. 
However, he asserted that a finding of discriminatory intent would shift the burden of 
proof to the defendants to show that the system had no unequal effect that would sup-
port an inference of current discriminatory intent. Disregarding the Gingles factors 
altogether, he measured the degree of discrimination only against a proportional repre-
sentation standard. 17% of Virginia's population was black, and 17% of the state's 
appointed school board members were black. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on this 
ground. 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir., 1989). In most cases, defendants will have mOre trou-
ble satisfying a proportional representation criterion. 
68Garza, 918 F.2d at 771. In an extreme opinion in Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F.Supp. 
553 (E.D. Ark. 1991), Judge G. Thomas Eisele ruled that only a retrogression in minority 
voting strength qualified as a discriminatory effect under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act; that there was no retrogression in the case; that proving intent was insufficient 
unless effect were also proven; and therefore that intent was ,irrelev.ant. . He did not 
trouble himself to reconcile these legal positions with White, Bolden, Lodge, or the 1982 
Senate Report. Strongly contrary is the opinion of Judge Myron H. Thompson in the 
case of Dillard v. Crellshaw COUllty, 649 F.Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1986), who ruled at 297 
that if intent were proven for recently adopted electoral rules, no effect need be shown. 
Similarly, in Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F.Supp. 1473 (1983), at 1484, Thompson concluded 
that "even though a redistricting plan may accurately reflect the voting strength of a 
minority group, it is still invalid if it was adopted for a racialiy discriminatory purpose. l ; 
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D. CARVING UP YOUNGSTOWN 
Whenever the Democratic majority on the Ohio State Apportionment Board, which designed 
districts for the Ohio State House of Representatives in 1981, found a large enough minority 
concentration to form a majority of a district, they drew one. When the concentration was too 
small, however, the consultants disregarded it, paying attention, instead, to the desires of white 
incumbents in the area. Accordingly, districts 52 and 53 cracked the black community in 
Youngstown, joining two-thirds of it to one set of white suburbs, and the other third to other 
white suburbs.69 Although the Board could have drawn two contiguous districts that were 36% 
black and 1% black, respectively, in fact it drew two' with- percentages of 25% and 11%. The 
actual districts split both incorporated and unincorporated areas more than the plaintiffs' 
proposed 36%/1% districts did.10 
Pointing out that Brennan's opinion in Gingles specifically refused to rule out influence 
districts, and distinguishing contrary lower federal court cases because they dealt with at-large 
elections, rather than boundaries between single-member districts, the majority of a three-judge 
panel ruled for the plaintiffs on both intent and effect grounds. 71 Although Ezell Armour's 
attorneys did not put on a full-blown intent case, the court, in examining in detail all the 
elements of a "totality of the circumstances" case, did sketch much of the basis for an intent, as 
well as an effects case. For example, it found a history of extralegal segregation in schools and 
other instances of discrimination, including a takeover of the city government by the Ku Klux 
Klan during the 1920s, racial appeals in recent campaigns, racial violence, and racially polarized 
voting 72 -- all of which would be part of an intent case, because they no doubt conditioned the 
expectations and actions of voters and of key decisionmakers in the reapportionment. As in 
Garza, the Armour court emphasized that white incumbents helped to engineer a split in the 
minority community in order to benefit themselves.73 
Judge Batchelder dissented, ignoring the intent portion of the Armour majority's decision, 
citing but adding nothing to the criticisms of the justiciability of influence districts in the 
opinions in Springfield Park District, and offering only a scattershot, self-contradictory critique 
of the plaintiff's racial polarization analysis. On the one hand, Batchelder proposed to discard 
as irrelevant to this case analyses of elections other than those for the House; on the other hand, 
69 Armour v. Ohio, 775 F.Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991), at 1060-61. It is unclear from 
the published opinion what criteria the Apportionment Board used to determine whether 
blacks had a "majority" in an area, or how closely connected black communities had to 
be to be eligible for consolidation into a district. 
7°775 F.Supp. at 1047, 1064-67. 
71 775 F.Supp. at 1051-52, 1060-61. Accord Emison v. Growe, 782 F.Supp. 427 
(D.Minn. 1992), at 436. 
72 Id., at 1053-56. 
73T..I _. 1A£1 
.lU., ClL JVUl. 
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she criticized the plaintiffs' expert for having too few remaining cases on which to rest a solid 
conclusion?4 By endorsing the view in Springfield Park District that blacks could not elect a 
candidate in a district in which they did not constitute a majority, Batchelder implicitly 
assumed that voting was markedly polarized along racial lines. Yet she also asserted that, with 
25% of the voters, blacks could control the Democratic primary and win the general election in 
District 53, a position that assumed a considerable willingness of whites to vote for a black-
backed candidate?5 Although she concluded her opinion by touting an intent standard in 
Fifteenth Amendment cases, the dissenter did not say how a racially discriminatory intent might 
be proved to her satisfaction or why the majority's evidence of intent was insufficient. 76 
E. THE TALE OF THREE CASES 
These three decisions further focus our approach to influence districts. Rigid, absolute 
thresholds either repulse potentially winning minority candidates, as in Springfield Park 
District, or consume inordinate amounts of the courts' time and the parties' efforts and expense, 
as in Garza. Sensitively applied, the three-pronged Gingles test may be more complicated and 
less certain than a totality of the circumstances inquiry, whether such an inquiry is 
characterized as an effect test or an intent test.77 After Garza and Armour, attorneys for 
plaintiffs may wish at least to add intent components to their cases, and those for both 
plaintiffs and defendants will have to study history, as well as statistics and demography. 
V. PURPOSE AND EFFECT STANDARDS FOR INFLUENCE DISTRICTS 
A. A DOUBLE STANDARD 
How, then, should courts approach cases in which the proportion of one or more minority 
groups in a potential district is not overwhelming? In keeping with the Congress's desire in 
amending Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, I suggest both effect and purpose 
standards. The effect standard recognizes that estimates are uncertain and that in this instance, 
they are subject to eventualities outside a court's control -- the willingness of attractive 
candidates to run, the ability to pull together inter-ethnic coalitions, the degree of involvement 
74Id., at 1073-75. 
75 Id., at 1081, 1084. 
76 Id., at 1088. 
77Here , I differ with Grofman and Handley, "Identifying and Remedying Racial 
Gerrymandering," The lounzal of Law and Politics, 8 (1992), 345, at 357-59. 
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of various groups in the political system. The discussion of intent reflects an attempt to make 
that inquiry as systematic as possible. 
B. PROVING EFFECT IN INFLUENCE DISTRICT CASES 
Decrying the "artificiality" of the distinction between "influence" and "control" districts, 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asserted in her concurrence in Gingles that "if a minority group 
that is not large enough to constitute a voting majority in a single-member district can show 
that white support would probably be forthcoming in some such~istrict to an extent that would 
enable the election of the candidates its members prefer, that minority group would appear to 
have demonstrated that, at least under this measure of its voting strength, it would be able to 
elect some candidates of its choice.',78 The Gingles standard as I have interpreted it -- that is, 
as a single test, not three separate ones -- would require just that, with one amendment: In 
areas in which there is more than one minority group, the potential for cross-overs between 
minority groups should also be considered. 
In practical terms, the first question to be asked in district boundary cases is whether an 
area of minority group concentration has been split.79 Whether one or more places qualify as 
such an area must be determined by the specifics of each case, but some general guidelines are 
that they should be geographically close together, socioeconomically related, and/or that the 
jurisdiction has traditionally joined them together into the same district or placed comparably 
close areas into one district. For instance, in Monterey county, California, the nearby cities of 
Seaside and Marina and the adjacent and socioeconomically related military base of Fort Ord 
were divided among four supervisorial districts by the reapportionment of 1991. Rejecting a 
proposed district in which African-Americans constituted 20% of the population and 
Asian/Pacific Islanders, 16%, the Supervisors instead adopted a plan in which neither made up 
78106 S.Ct. at 2787, note 1. In Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S.C!. 2354 (1991), at 2365, 2371-
72, Justices Stevens and Scalia disagreed sharply over whether the "participate and elect" 
standard is unitary -- i.e., whether the fact of unequal opportunity to participate in 
elections is sufficient by itself to violate the Voting Rights Act. As Scalia points out, 
Stevens's majority view that Congress meant the phrase to be a unit may imply that 
minorities that cannot show with certainty that they can elect candidates in proposed 
districts will be denied any remedy. But once it is realized that there is no clear divid-
ing line between influence and control, the controversy dissolves. There is merely a 
continuum of more or less participation. Had Stevens and Scalia paid more attention to 
O'Connor's footnote in Gingles, there would have,been no reason for theiLcharges and 
countercharges. 
Judge Arnold put the point simply and logically in Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp. 196, 
at 204 (E.D.Ark. 1989): "If I can vote at will but never elect anyone, my political ability 
is less than yours." 
79Here, again, I agree with Grofman and Handley, "Identifying and Remedying Racial 
Gerrymandering," Journal of Law and Politics, 8 (1992), 345, at 372. 
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more than 10% of any district.80 Seaside, Marina, and Fort Ord were joined in a school 
district, and although they had been placed in different supervisorial districts, other areas that 
were much farther apart had long been included in the same supervisorial districts within the 
county. Such a fragmentation would establish either the beginnings of an -effect case or, under 
Garza, the necessary injury in an intent case. 
Fragmentation would also demonstrate foresight in an intent case, because in recent 
reapportionments, planners have calculated and highlighted the ethnic percentages in different 
districts under alternative proposed boundaries. Therefore, the decisionmakers had to have been 
aware of the ethnic consequences of their actions.81 The current technology and 
selfconsciousness of reapportionments guarantees that any fragmentation was foreseen, and the 
country's long history of discrimination against minorities in politics suggests that redistricters 
who severed minority areas meant to treat minorities with less concern and respect than they 
did whites. 
The second step in an effect case would be to determine, through an analysis of past voting 
records in the area, whether a minority concentration at the level of the proposed district would 
significantly improve the opportunity of the dominant minority group, in coalition with some 
members of other groups, to elect candidates of its choice. If under the previous or status quo 
arrangement -- either an at-large system or single-member districts with different boundaries 
-- the minority group had regularly been able to elect candidates of its choice, including 
members of the minority group itself,82 then it would be extremely difficult to make out an 
effects case. If, on the other hand, there was evidence of potent, but generally unsuccessful 
coalitions between members of different minority groups or between one or more of the groups 
and the majority group, then a case might succeed. In considering likely future electoral 
success, one should, of course, be aware that changes in the demographic mix may well alter 
perceived electoral opportunities: If minority candidates feel that they have little chance to 
win, few or no serious minority candidates may run; whereas, when they suddenly have a 
80Kousser, "Tacking, StaCking, and Cracking: 75-82. 
81See Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F.Supp. 585, at 589 (E.D. Ark. 1990) for a judicial 
example of this reasoning. 
82 American political history overwhelmingly demonstrates that, other things being 
equal, members of particular ethnic groups most prefer to elect "one of their own." It 
was true of the Irish in the nineteenth century, and it is true of African-Americans and 
Latinos today. Cf. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp 196, at 198 (E.D. Ark. 1989). When 
the electoral structure is sufficiently discriminatory and the level of racial bloc voting by 
the dominant group .is sufficiently: high, however;.b!acks...Latinos, and Asian/Pacific 
Islanders may have no choice but to vote for Anglo candidates. It would be a sad irony 
if such white-on-white elections were cited as conclusive evidence that minorities had 
attained their political goals by voting for the winning white. Such a counting rule 
would, in effect, reward the most discriminatory places for their stalwartness in bloc 
voting and erecting effective legal barriers. For examples of such a rule, see Judge 
Chapman's dissent in Collins v. Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989), at 1247; SCLC 
v. Evans, 785 F.Supp 1469, at 14i3-76 (MD.Aia. i992). 
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greatly enhanced ability to be elected, the number of serious minority candidates and the extent 
of minority participation may rise dramatically.83 Therefore, a failure of small minority group-
ings to produce minority candidates is not, as Judge Eisele implies in his partial concurrence in 
leffers v. Clinton, proof that voting will not be racially polarized in districts with larger 
proportions of minority citizens.84 In partisan contests, the proportion of the dominant 
minority group necessary to have a high probability of effectively controlling the district might 
well be lower than in nonpartisan elections, because a percentage well below 50% of the voters 
could comprise a majority of the dominant political party. In such an instance, the crucial 
question would be the likely extent of white or other group defection from minority-backed 
party nominees in the general election. 
As argued in Section III of this paper, there is no absolute, situation-free threshold for the 
ability to elect candidates of choice. An acceptance of this relativism solves one of the most 
common problems raised about influence districts. Suppose a planner has the option of creating 
two 20% minority districts, or one 30% and one 10% district. What should the planner do, and 
what is she legally required to do? My position implies that, other things being equal, the 
planner should adopt the 30/10 solution, rather than the 20/20 solution, because, first, it 
minimizes fragmentation; and second, it improves the opportunity of members of the minority 
group, in coalition with some members of other groups, to elect candidates of their choice, and 
perhaps even makes that election rather likely. 
The relativistic position also helps to solve the mirror image of the influence problem, the 
"packing" dilemma. What criteria should a planner or court adopt to decide whether a minority 
group's overall political power has been decreased by concentrating them in "too few" districts? 
Whereas an absolute standard would compare the concentration to some arbitrary level -- 65%, 
50%, or whatever -- and condemn a plan that "wasted" minority votes by creating districts in 
excess of that level, a relativistic approach would consider the proportion necessary to elect a 
candidate of choice with a high probability in a particular situation at a particular time. In 
some places, the level might be in· the range of 70-80%; in others, 20-30%. And the "excess" 
minority populations left over after the drawing of highly concentrated districts would not be 
considered as legally or politically worthless, but as providing the basis for possibly influential 
groupings. As part of a remedy for illegally packed districts, courts should create districts in 
which minority groups can exert as much influence as possible. 
Aside from the Gingles test, should there be any role for the other White-Zimmer factors in 
83 Although there had not been a serious Latino candidate for Supervisor in Los Angeles 
county from 1958 to 1990, after a new electoral district was drawn in the remedy phase 
of Garza, all of the major candidates were Mexican-Americans. In Monterey county, 
after two black candidates for SupervisQf finished first in primary. elections, but lost in 
runoffs in 1976, and the districts were redrawn to "whiten" each in 1981, no blacks ran 
for Supervisor, although two black politicians indicated in court documents connected 
with Gonzalez v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors that they would have run during 
the 1980s had the district lines been drawn more favorably. 
84leffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp. 196, at 274-77 (E.D.Ark. 1989) (Eisele, partially 
concurring). 
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an effect case? I think that attorneys and judges would be well advised to include a discussion 
of them for two reasons: First, they bear on the probability that members of a minority group 
will be able to elect candidates of their choice.85 The history of discrimination and its 
continuing consequences in an area affects the expected cohesiveness and participation levels of 
members of a minority group. A slating process or racial appeals in campaigns may affect the 
level of cross-overs between majority and minority groups. Discriminatory electoral devices 
may facilitate or retard the racial polarization of politics among different groups and therefore 
affect expectations of the degree of cross-overs in a changed system. For instance, a minority 
community that is submerged in an at-large election system or in districts that fragment it may 
not foster minority candidates, but could be expected to do so under a fairly drawn single 
member district system. The effects of this shift on voter and candidate behavior should be 
taken into account in assessing the possibility that minority communities would be able to elect 
candidates of their choice under a proposed system.86 Second, the three-pronged test in 
Brennan's opinion in Gingles commanded only five votes. Justice O'Connor's concurrence, 
which opted for a totality of the circumstances approach, attracted three more votes. With the 
changes in the Supreme Court's makeup -- two members from each side no longer serve -- it is 
unclear how secure the Gingles test is as a precedent. 
Either a White-Zimmer analysis or a sophisticated version of the Gingles test will require 
considerable attention to local detail, and the outcome of an effects case will not be obtained by 
mechanically filling in a few demographic statistics. This is as it should be, for the problems of 
racial relations in American politics are complex and extremely varied in our most variable. 
ever-changing country. To try to impose a single uniform solution is to ignore both our history 
and our contemporary diversity. 
C. THE SEARCH FOR INTENT CAN BE SYSTEMATIC 
Inquiries into intent have a worse reputation than they deserve. After laying the basis for 
an intent case in his 7th Circuit opinion in Ketchum v. Byrne. Judge Cudahy condemned the 
process of proving intent as "inherently speculative" and commended the 1982 Congress for 
removing "the elusive and perhaps meaningless issue of governmental 'purpose'" as a prerequisite 
in voting rights cases.S7 Grofman. Handley. and Niemi declare that the standard for proving 
intent in voting rights cases may be a "moot issue" after the 1982 amendments. because Congress 
concluded that "intent was so difficult to prove" and because "proving racism" was "burdensome 
85Compare Judge Tjoflat's prudential advice in Solomon v, Liberty County. Florida. 865 
F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1988), at 1573. n. 8. and 1581. 
86The Fifth Circuit's failure to consider this possibility vitiates its argument in Brewer 
v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1989). 
87Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (1984). at 1408-10. 
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and racially divisive.,,88 In a report for Gonzales v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors, 
Handley essentially argued that intent is utterly irrelevant in voting rights cases, because even if 
one demonstrates a racially discriminatory intent, one must still make the same showing of 
effect as if one had ignored intent altogether. This is contrary not only to the Ninth Circuit's 
ruling in Garza, but to logic and Handley's earlier writings.89 It is instructive to note that the 
most scathing criticisms of intent contentions have recently come from the right, not the left of 
the political spectrum. In his dissent in the Louisiana "creation science" case, for instance, 
Justice Antonin Scalia asserted that "discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the 
statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.,,90 
Such criticisms ignore the fact that an inquiry into effect iilay"be highly' uncertain, as I 
have argued above, and that an examination of intent may be systematic, as I tried to 
demonstrate in the Garza case, and as I have tried to show at length in a paper based on my 
testimony in that case.91 Here, I will fairly briefly summarize the nine intent factors that I lay 
out in more detail in that paper, as well as the rationales for each of them. Together, they 
show how one can approach such questions more objectively. 
The first factor is models of human behavior in particular situations, which are often drawn 
from experience or research. For instance, have lines between electoral districts been used 
elsewhere to make it more difficult for members of protected minority groups to elect 
candidates of their choice? The answer is, of course, yes, and the more historians and expert 
witnesses learn about such instances, the more they find racially and politically discriminatory 
purposes and effects in reapportionment. During the "First Reconstruction" after the Civil War 
-- just as soon as African-Americans constituted a large enough enfranchised group to have a 
major influence on elections in the U.S. -- whites began to draw district lines to dilute black 
political power. The Garza case showed conclusively that racial gerrymandering takes place in 
contemporary California. It is also the tritest of truisms to note that politicians' self -interest is 
never closer to the surface than during reapportionment. When those who do the redistricting 
are all Anglo, and members of minority groups form large groups of voters, one should at the 
very least be alertly on guard for possibly discriminatory acts. 
88Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard G. Niemi, Minority Representation and 
the Quest for Voting Equality (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), 42, 52. 
89Lisa R. Handley, "Proving Injury in an Intentional Discrimination Suit: A Report for 
Gonzales v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors," (mimeo, Oct. 7, 1992), at 2. 
Compare Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, at 771 (9th Cir. 1990); Handley, 
"The Quest for Minority Voting Rights," (unpub. Ph.D. diss., George Washington Univ., 
1991), at 250, n. 28; Grofman, Handley, and Niemi, Minority Representation, at 114, 
143, n.30. 
90Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S.C!. 2573, at 2605 (1987) (Scalia dissenting). Similarly, 
see Chisom v. Roemer, III S.C!. 2354, at 2376 (1991) (Scalia dissenting). 
9]"How to Determine Intent: Lessons from L.A.," The Journal of Law and Politics, 7 
fln('\l\ .en1 ,.,.,"" 
\..1771), J7J-I:J~. 
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Such models, whether explicit or implicit, whether based on scholarship or experience, 
whether acknowledged or unacknowledged, do affect where the analyst starts, and the only 
honest thing to do is to be selfconscious of the fact and to admit it. Someone who believes that 
politicians are always selfless altruists who draw district lines thinking only of the public good, 
and never of the effects on their own political fortunes and those of their partisan or ideological 
allies, will expect to find only disinterested motives in particular cases. The most hard-boiled 
political consultants claimed during the Garza case to have acted entirely selflessly. More 
skeptical observers do not take such statements at face value. 
The second factor is the historical context. Were racial issues or political campaigns by 
members of minority groups important at the time .and place? In .Garza,for instance, it was 
extremely significant that there was special redistricting in 1959 that resulted in a large shift of 
Anglo voters in West Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, and West Hollywood from the Fourth to the 
Third District. This came less than a year before the census was to be taken and just after a 
very close contest in the Third District in which an Anglo candidate defeated a Mexican-
American. 
A third factor may be the exact text of a law or the exact lines of a redistricting, and a 
fourth is basic demographic facts. To what extent did the district lines fragment minority 
communities? (Here, the intent and effect cases overlap considerably.) How many members of 
relevant minority groups were there, how concentrated were they, and what were the trends in 
the population? In Garza, the rapid growth of the Latino population in an area split between 
two supervisorial districts was an important fact that did not escape the attention of those who 
drew district lines. During the redistricting in Monterey county in 1991-92, the wide array of 
plans, all with demographic totals neatly attached, as if to prove that ethnic considerations could 
never have been missed by any participant, shows just how ethnically self-conscious the line-
drawing by the all-white Board was.92 Every proposed district line tells a story. 
Two basic political facts that constitute the fifth factor are the number of minority group 
members elected and the approximate extent of racial polarization among the voters. The 
former is a measure of effect, and the latter, insofar as it is widely known, can be assumed to 
inform the decisions of those who design electoral structures. For example, in Los Angeles 
County before 1991, it was well known that no Latino had served as a supervisor in this 
century, and it was widely understood that Latino candidates had little chance to win elections 
in overwhelmingly Anglo districts. Therefore. redistricters had to have been well aware that 
districts that contained large majorities of Anglo voters were extremely unlikely to elect 
candidates that were the first preferences of Latinos. In Monterey county, no black or Latino 
has been elected supervisor in this century, although two black candidates threatened to win 
during the 1970s, before the 1981 reapportionment. 
The sixth and seventh factors are the background· ofkeydedsionmaker-s and other actions 
that they performed. Were they all white? Did they allow all minority groups a real forum in 
92Kousser, "Tacking, Stacking, and Cracking: Race and Reapportionment in Monterey 
County, 1981-1992," mimeo, Sept. 9, 1992, a report written in connection with Gonzalez 
v . . Monterey Count)' Board 0/ Supe;visors. 
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which they could express themselves on the decision? What other policies that affected 
minority groups did the decisionmakers favor and carry out? 
Sometimes, decisionmakers will make what are termed "smoking gun" statements, and they 
constitute the eighth factor. When a "numbered post" system was substituted for a "free-for-all" 
at-large election system in Memphis, Tennessee in 1959, a newspaper article on the relevant 
bill, based on interviews with legislators, was headlined "Bill ... Has Racial Purpose."93 The 
story went on to explain at length just how blacks would be disadvantaged by the change. In 
California in the late twentieth century, politicians are generally too careful to make "smoking 
gun" state1:llents. 
State policies and formal and informal institutional rules constitute the final-factor. If a 
locality is merely following a mandated state policy (for instance, one providing for at-large 
elections for all cities of a specified size range), then it is difficult to attribute any particular 
motive to the locality. Departures from usual rules or practices may- hint at ulterior motives.94 
In a recent case decided by the U.S. -Supreme Court, boards of county supervisors in Alabama 
changed the rules to strip individual board members of powers that they had previously had just 
after the first election of a black to the board.95 Although the Court decided that such a move 
did not have to be precleared by the Justice Department, it seems likely that it could be 
challenged as intentionally discriminatory under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In reapportionment cases, inconsistency in dealing with different areas 
or groups, or inconsistent or frivolous justifications of various decisions may provide evidence 
of ulterior, possibly racial motives. 
D. TESTING OTHER EXPLANATIONS 
Arraying the evidence under these nine rubrics is not the end of the inquiry. Deciding that 
racial motives played a significant role in shaping an electoral rule or boundary requires one to 
set out and assess other, competing rationales or explanations for the device. What is the best 
warranted explanation? 
Those who wrote the electoral rules and lawyers defending them will probably suggest 
rationales or explanations besides racially discriminatory ones. Even if they do not, it is nearly 
always possible to formulate superficially plausible hypotheses of good intentions (e.g., they 
93Kousser, "Was Memphis's Electoral Structure Adopted or Maintained For a Racially 
Discriminatory Purpose?" Social Science Working Paper 807, California Institute of 
Technology, August, 1992, at 17, quoting Memphis Press-Scimitar, Feb. 19, 1959, at p. 
4, c. 1-3. 
94See McMillan v. Escambia County, Florida, 638 F.2d 1239 (1981), at 1245-46, on the 
switch from single-member districts to at-large elections in the wake of the outlawing of 
the white primary. 
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were trying to help minorities) and other intentions (they wanted to preserve city boundaries, 
draw "compact" districts, or insure majoritarianism as an abstract principle). Every such theory 
should b~ stated as clearly as possible and all evidence for and against all of them should be 
arrayed as fairly and objectively as the analyst can manage within the time and space available. 
(If an expert leaves anything out, surely opposing lawyers will fill it in.) In the end, the expert 
and ultimately the judge must weigh the evidence and decide whether the thesis that the rule 
makers intended to discriminate is well-founded. Discrimination need not have been their sole 
or primary motive, but it must have been an important one or one necessarily entailed by an 
important one. It may have been possible to protect white incumbents, for instance, only by 
disadvantaging potential minority challengers;96 
Whatever the outcome, the determination of intent will always be a matter of judgment 
(isn't that what judges are supposed to do?), rather than a mechanical task, and the process of 
sifting the evidence will be exactly the same whether the minority group constitutes 75% of a 
population or 10%. In determining intent, there is no difference whatsoever between influence 
districts and control districts. 
E. A DEFENSE OF THE INFLUENCE CONCEPT 
Bright-line standards circumscribe, but preserve rights. Some in the voting rights 
community97 fear that recognizing the unrealistic nature of such a standard in this instance will 
endanger rights already seemingly won -- that Anglo judges may decide that it is "best" for 
minority voters to have their influence spread widely, rather than being able to control some 
districts, or that they may rule that the decision on what is best for minorities should not be 
made by judges, but should properly be left up to elected Anglo politicians. Better to force a 
49% minority or a 10% minority to fend for itself, the argument goes, than to hazard the loss of 
minority representation by stressing that influence is a relative, not an absolute concept, and 
suggesting that judges must scrutinize the political process carefully and realistically in order to 
protect minority rights in accordance with the Constitution and the laws. Judges want a simple 
test -- don't puncture their illusions! 
Thus, Grofman, Handley, and Niemi proclaim that "the Gingles three-pronged test places 
the focus on a set of relatively clear, objective criteria, creating a manageable standard with a 
list of critical factors that is both small and closed ended." They fear that if influence district 
claims are allowed, "minorities might be harmed more than helped .... The concept of 
96Rybicki v. Board 0/ Elections, 574.E.Supp. 1082 (J982),at 1109-10; .Garza v. County 
0/ Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), at 768, note I, paragraph 180. 
97This section primarily responds to comments made at the University of San Francisco 
Voting Rights Symposium, Nov. 6-7, 1992, and transmitted to me by Nancy Ramirez. I 
want to thank Nancy for her assistance in this respect, but reserve for myself any criti-
cism for errors in the transmogrification of the arguments. I have stated the arguments 
in my own words and have attempted to deveiop them iogicaily. 
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influence is murky .... Where there are 'electability' claims at issue, there is a natural 
threshold. Without such a threshold, how does one decide whether shifting minorities from one 
district to another increases or decreases their overall influence?,,98 
In her report for Gonzalez v. Monterey County, Handley rejects a 50% population standard, 
but proposes retaining a more sophisticated bright-line test. To merit relief, Handley suggests, 
plaintiffs must be able to show that they could garner enough minority and white crossover 
support to win a future election in a reconfigured district. For instance, suppose a district 
could be drawn in which minority voters comprised 20% of the population. Consider the range 
of percentages of majority and minority cohesion in a 20% district in Table I, above. If in past 
elections in a district in the area with less than 20% minority voters, 60% of the majority voters 
had voted for the majority-preferred candidate, and 100% of the minority voters had voted for 
the minority-preferred candidate, then if the same cohesion levels continued in the 20% 
minority district, the minority-preferred candidate would obtain 52% of the vote. In that case, 
Handley would say that the minority plaintiffs were at least potentially eligible for relief, 
depending on other facts in the case. If minority cohesion in the previous election had been 
only 80%, however, the minority-preferred candidate, under the same assumptions, would be 
expected to win only 48% of the vote, and Handley would say that plaintiffs had not met the 
threshold test and deny them any relief.99 
But as Grofman, Handley, and Niemi are well aware,IOO there are no natural thresholds, 
and the ability of social science to predict future outcomes is imperfect. Influence is a 
continuum, not an absolute. Unless there is a revolution in theories of human behavior, it will 
never be possible to establish a precise point, even in a particular jurisdiction at a particular 
time, above which one group is guaranteed an election, and below which, it will certainly lose. 
Even though Handley's proposed test for influence districts is much more subtle and flexible 
than a pure demographic criterion, it is still more sharp-edged than the predictive capacity of 
social science allows. There are just too many variable factors -- the availability of skilled 
candidates, national or state electoral trends, the temperature of racial issues at the time, etc. --
to be able to forecast future political outcomes within a very few percentage points. The best 
we can do is to say that, up to the range at which districts are "too packed" with members of 
98 Minority Representation, at 60, 117-18. 
99During the course of the Gonzalez case, plaintiffs drew a district that was 23% black 
in total population. Using statistics from the campaign of the last black candidate in the 
major part of the district, which took place in 1976, Handley contended that it would 
take a district that was 26% black to guarantee a black candidate in the 1990s a majori-
ty, and argued that therefore plaintiffs.should be denied· relief .. In fact,if one included 
only those areas with high white crossover voting in 1976, which formed nearly all of 
the plaintiffs' proposed new district, the prediction would be that a black candidate 
(under the same circumstances as in the 1976 election) would receive 49% of the vote in 
a 23% black district. It would seem extremely arbitrary to deny relief on the basis of 
numbers that were at once this close and this uncertain. 
lOO!vfinority Representation, at i20. 
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one group, every increase in the group's proportion is an increase in its influence, other things 
being equal. 
Second, good theories aren't based on fictions. If a proposed bright line isn't, in fact, 
nearly so clear as its proponents contend, the legal community will discover the fact eventually, 
placing the whole enterprise at risk. Better to acknowledge a frailty now and deal with it than 
to hazard a collapse later. 
Third, as I stressed above, small clusters of minorities need and deserve protection at least 
as much as large clusters do, and as voters from different ethnic groups become more willing to 
cast crossover votes, the opportunities for members of minority groups to be elected will be 
enhanced, not damaged by drawing influence districts. If AftiC"an"American, Latino, and Asian 
aspirants can run not only in majority-minority districts, but also in districts that are, say, 20-
49% minority, then over the long run, there will be more, not fewer members of these groups in 
office. 
Fourth, influence districts encourage interracial coalitions, and a standard that concentrates 
minority groups diminishes the probability that they will forever be condemned to be distinctly 
junior coalition partners. If members of minority groups are scattered randomly across districts, 
residual racism among Anglo voters and the present effects of past and present ethnic 
discrimination will continue to hamper minority political power. If, instead, we recognize that 
members of minority groups continue to need special safeguards to overcome persisting 
discrimination and racism, and we concentrate minority voters to provide those safeguards, then 
politicians of all races will be less able to ignore minority voters or take them for granted even 
in districts where the minorities will probably not be able to win outright. 
Those who favor a bright-line standard to create heavily minority districts err for the same 
reason as those who oppose any judicial or administrative intervention in matters of electoral 
structure at all. Both treat racism or racial discrimination as categorical, rather than as interval-
level variables.I OI But the history of inter-ethnic attitudes and behavior in the U.S. and 
elsewhere shows that racism or ethnocentrism is not like a simple light switch, either off or on, 
but like a more sophisticated dimmer switch. I 02 Proponents of control districts think that in 
the vast majority of places, the racist light is still completely on; their opponents, that it is 
usually completely off. In my view, racism has faded markedly, but by no means totally in the 
U.S. since the 1940s. Promoting judicial and administrative procedures that require practical, 
101 Abigail Thernstrom, Whose Votes Count? A//irmative Action alld Minority Voting 
Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), at 9-10, 131-33, 155, 196, 
238-39, 242. 
1020n the variable ·nature of· American.racism,see Donald ·G. Nieman, Premises to 
Keep: A/rican-Americans and the Constitutional Order. 1776 to the Present (New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1991); Kousser, Dead End: The Development 0/ Nineteenth Century 
Litigation on Racial Discrimination in Schools (Oxford, Eng.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986); 
Kousser, "Before Plessy, Before Brown: The Development of the Law of Racial Integra-
tion in Louisiana and Kansas," in Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb, eds., Toward 
a Usable Past: Liberty Under Stale Constitutions (Athens, Ga. and London: Univ. of 
Georgia Press, 1991), 213-70. 
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particularized appraisals and remedies that include districts in which minorities will enjoy 
various degrees of influence recognizes that racism is a variable phenomenon and treats it with 
a measured and serious response. 
Fifth, the bright-line standards in effect now do not offer adequate protection against 
determined redistricters, attorneys, and judges, nor do the standards inhibit judges from 
deciding that minorities are better off fractured. In his partial concurrence and dissent in the 
two Jeffers v. Clinton cases, Judge G. Thomas Eisele repudiated an "ability to elect" standard 
completely,103 and, when he grudgingly applied it, applied it bizarrely. In one area in which 
blacks comprised 45% of the voting age population of a district, Eisele ruled this a minority-
controlled district without inquiring into registration, turnout, or cohesion levels, because 5% or 
more of the white voters usually crossed over to vote for a black candidate. By mechanically 
applying a strange interpretation of the Gingles test, Eisele denied blacks the practical ability to 
control elections. 104 In other places, two or more black areas that were close together, but had 
never been placed in the same electoral district before were proposed to be joined to create 
black majority districts. Even though plaintiffs proved that black candidates usually lost in the 
areas because of white bloc voting, and that blacks in most of the parts of the districts had 
backed the same candidates in the past, Eisele still favored denying them relief because they 
could not show that the newly joined black communities would be politically cohesive with each 
other.105 This amounts to a judicial catch-22: to merit relief, one must demonstrate minority 
cohesion, but to demonstrate cohesion, one must first have obtained relief. Thus, Eisele 
exploited the formalistic character of the Gingles test to uphold the racial and political status 
quo. As it stands today, then, the Gingles test, if formulated adversely enough, can deprive 
minorities even of "control" districts. 
Nor does Gingles stop judges from turning an "ability to elect" standard into something else. 
Immediately after quoting Gingles, Fifth Circuit Judge Gee in a 1988 case announced without 
citing further case law what might be called an "ability to compete" standard: "When we ask 
how far is far enough for courts to intervene in the political process, we must ask whether any 
group is systematically prevented from competing and coalescing with other groups to produce a 
realistic possibility for electoral victory. If groups are not systematically impeded in competing, 
courts must not interfere in the game of pOlitics."106 Despite the fact that the 21% black town 
103"What is required, what all must insist upon, is fair and equal opportunity for all to 
participate in the political process -- nothing more, nothing less. That is what the 
Voting Rights Act and our Constitution require." Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F.Supp. 585, at 
626 (E.D.Ark. 1990) (Eisele dissenting). 
104Jeffers v. Climon, 730 F.Supp. 196, at 251-52 (E.D.Ark., 1989). Judge Eisele's 
mathematics is as bad as his logic. If 5% of the 55% of the potential voters who are 
white joined the 45% of the voters who are black, the black-chosen candidate would get 
only 48% of the vote, not 50%. (.05*.55 = .0275) + .45 = .4775. 
I05 Ibid ., at 269-77. 
Footnote omitted. 
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of Oxford, Mississippi had never elected a black alderman, and that Mississippi had a notorious 
history of racism (which Judge Gee dismissed by referring to "the irrelevant criterion of 
race,,)107, the judge ruled that a district that was 54% black in population -- but surely much 
less in voting age population, registration, and turnout -- was legal. Unless this standard were 
interpreted to mean an equal ability to compete, it is difficult to see how, under it, any 
electoral structure whatsoever could be invalidated under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or 
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 
Perhaps worst of all, the Republican majority on the 1991 Ohio State Apportionment Board 
formalistically and disingenuously interpreted the first prong of Gingles to require them to pack 
the maximum number of blacks into individual State Assembly "districts. 108 Completely 
disregarding a level of white crossover voting that in 1990 allowed 7 of the II African 
American State Assemblypersons to be elected from districts in which less than a majority of 
the population was black -- that is, considering the prongs of Gingles in isolation from each 
other -- the Republicans employed Gingles in what two of three federal judges who heard the 
case recognized as an intentional effort to reduce the influence of black voters over the election 
of the legislature as a whole. No party to the case contended that race could not be taken into 
account, or that the state was not obliged to create districts in which black voters would an 
equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. The problem was the definition of 
"control." The Republicans wanted judges to blind themselves to the political reality that in 
contemporary Ohio, a district that is 35% black in population is extremely likely to elect the 
first choice of the black community, but, instead, to assume that Gingles dictated a 50% 
standard. The result would be to "waste" the maximum number of black votes, thereby 
diminishing both black and Democratic power. In other words, the Republican goal of reducing 
Democratic influence could only be accomplished by reducing the influence of blacks (at least 
85% of whom in Ohio regularly voted Democratic). That is, as has so often been the case in 
American history, racial and partisan motives were inextricably intertwined. I 09 What the U.S. 
Supreme Court's response will be to this argument, a perverted outgrowth of Gingles, is not 
clear as of the time of this writing. 
107 Ibid., at 343, n. I. 
108Quilier v. VOillovich, No. 91-CV-2219 (N.D. Ohio, Jan. 3.1, 1992), slip opinion at 7-
10; and ibid., (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 19, 1992), slip opinion. Further facts about this case 
will be drawn, without further citation, from these opinions and from the briefs and oral 
argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
I09See Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restriction and the Estab-
lishment of the One-Party South. 1880-1910 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 
1974). 
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F. THE TEST OF TRADITION 
The effect and intent approach outlined above accords with tradition, logic, and much, 
though not all recent case law. As for tradition, the only period in which the courts and 
Congress accepted mechanistic, bright-line tests was the period of massive discrimination and 
black disfranchisement. Conversely, during both Reconstructions, which represented the high 
points of fervor for minority rights in American history, Congress and the courts were flexible 
and practical. As for logic and more recent history, it is clear that there is no mathematical 
threshold that sets off influence districts from control districts, and that contemporary. 
experience in actual elections mirrors the hypothetical world sketched above in Table I. As for 
law, the most persuasive interpretation of Justice Brennan's prevailing opinion and Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence in Gingles is that the three prongs of the Gingles test ought to be 
considered as a unit, not separately. Subsequent lower court opinions that specifically consider 
the problem of influence districts either adopt tests like those that I propose (Garza and 
Armour) or, through specious reasoning, deny minority communities that would have good 
chances to elect candidates of their choice the opportunity to do so (Springfield Park District). 
Fears of the consequences of the abandonment of bright line tests are not without merit, but on 
the whole, are unpersuasive. Even now, such standards can be end run or even employed to 
undermine minority political potency. If the object of voting rights litigation generally is to 
fulfill the promise of Carolene Products to make sure that the political process is fair and honest 
and that minority groups do not suffer at the hands of majorities, then courts must intervene to 
prohibit discrimination in the electoral process against small, as well as large groups. 
33 
TABLE 1: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAJORITY AND MINORITY 
COHESIVENESS AND THE MINORITY CONCENTRATION NECESSARY TO ELECT 
% 0/ Minority Group 
in District 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 
15% 
10% 
Level 0/ 
Majority 
Cohesion 
100% 
70% 
100% 
70% 
100% 
80% 
70% 
70% 
100% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
70% 
60% 
60% 
55% 
70% 
60% 
55% 
55% 
70% 
55% 
60% 
52% 
34 
Level 0/ 
Minority 
Cohesion 
80% 
60% 
100% 
80% 
100% 
80% 
80% 
85% 
100% 
100% 
97% 
90% 
100% 
100% 
80% 
70% 
100% 
100% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
60% 
100% 
80% 
% For 
Minority's 
Candidate 
40% 
45% 
50% 
55% 
40% 
44% 
50% 
52% 
30% 
44% 
50% 
55% 
44% 
52% 
48% 
50% 
41 % 
49% 
47% 
50% 
37% 
47% 
46% 
51 % 
TABLE 2: DEMOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL TRAITS OF MINORITY CONGRES-
SIONAL AND STATE ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA, 1990 
District 
Number 
"Black Districts" 
8 
28 
29 
31 
"Latino Districts" 
25 
30 
34 
"Black Districts" 
13 
17 
47 
48 
49 
50 
54 
"Latino Districts" 
55 
56 
59 
79 
* Pop. = population 
% Black 
Pop.-
Panel A: 
25 
33 
34 
29 
9 
I 
3 
Panel B: 
38 
II 
23 
33 
40 
46 
22 
7 
3 
19 
% Latino 
Reg." 
% Anglo 
Pop. 
Congressional Districts 
5 52 
8 16 
14 4 
12 19 
41 13 
40 17 
40 28 
State Assembly Districts 
7 29 
5 55 
18 5 
16 5 
5 27 
6 16 
9 38 
40 15 
66 6 
45 19 
16 35 
**Reg. = estimated number of registered voters 
35 
% Democratic 
Registration 
63 
72 
82 
71 
57 
58 
61 
72 
63 
81 
83 
72 
77 
64 
66 
74 
61 
55 

